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Summary
Irrigation system modernization with the structured
system design is increasingly adopted in irrigation
improvement programs in the Indian subcontinent
and elsewhere in view of less management efforts
needed to operate such a modernized system.
This report evaluates the performance of the
Bhadra Reservoir Project in India—before, during,
and after the introduction of modernization with the
structured system design. The performance
analysis, supported by data generated by remote
sensing techniques, office records, field visits, and
farmer surveys focused on water management,
agricultural productivity, and farmer participation
and perception. The analysis of the Indian Remote
Sensing Satellite (IRS IC) Wide Field Sensor
(WiFS) data on 20 overpass dates during the rice
growth cycle particularly proved valuable to
evaluate the water distribution between the
distributary commands during the most recent rabi
(January to May) season.
The structured system design and an equitable
supply-based technology, central to the National
Water Management Project (NWMP) intervention in
the Bhadra project, did not succeed for various
reasons analyzed in this report. The analysis
indicates, among other things, that water utilization
after the NWMP intervention has increased as a
result of the cropping pattern being dominated by
water-intensive crops such as rice during the rabi
season. Preferential allocation to the head end of
the command persisted even after intervention, with
inequity setting in within the distributary command.
The tail-end water supply deprivation was partially
offset by farmers practicing deficit irrigation. The
advancement of the kharif (July to November) and
rabi seasons and the consequent, envisaged water
saving have not taken place. The participation of
farmers in decision making at the scheme level,
and sharing of water at the distributary level and
below were very poor. However, the gains in
agricultural productivity achieved during the
intervention period have not registered any
significant decline.
The absence of a continuing support
mechanism by way of institutional arrangements
and the lack of effective farmer participation and
involvement in implementing the operational plan
have been the major causes for decline of the
Bhadra project with water management sliding back
to a quasi-demand-based supply. The productivity
per unit of water was also on the decline. Strong
farmer involvement thus holds the key for
sustainable performance.1
Modernization Using the Structured System Design of the
Bhadra Reservoir Project, India: An Intervention Analysis
R. Sakthivadivel, S. Thiruvengadachari, and Upali A. Amarasinghe
Introduction
The structured system design enables control of
water flow in irrigation projects through the use of
proportional devices such as the Adjustable
Proportional Module (APM) without human
intervention, by adopting an intermittent, designed
water supply in the distributary canals and
operating with a systematic operational plan. This
structured system concept, advocated by the
World Bank (Shanan 1992), is being increasingly
adopted in the Indian subcontinent and elsewhere
in the rehabilitation and modernization of irrigation
projects. Some of these modernized projects were
under operation for more than 5 years after the
withdrawal of World Bank assistance. A holistic
performance evaluation of such systems,
especially how well they have been sustained
after the closure of loan facilities, is of great
significance not only to the Indian subcontinent
but also to other developing countries that try to
adopt this concept with limited financial allocation
for irrigation operation, maintenance, and
management, and face increasing competition for
water and interference by vested interests.
The structured system design is central to the
World Bank-funded National Water Management
Project (NWMP) that covered about 80 schemes
in 11 States in India during 1988–95. Subsequent
to the NWMP, this design was extended to the
ongoing Water Resources Consolidation Project
(WRCP) in the States of Tamil Nadu and Orissa.
In view of its widespread adoption, there is a need
to evaluate the structured system design in
improving the irrigated agricultural performance.
This report attempts to evaluate the Bhadra
Reservoir Project (BRP) in the Karnataka State,
which was one of the earliest projects to adopt the
structured system design under the NWMP. The
main objective of this report is to carry out a
comparative analysis of the BRP before, during,
and after the NWMP intervention. While the main
focus is on water distribution and agricultural
productivity, the analysis also briefly covers other
relevant issues such as farmer participation,
monitoring and evaluation, and training. The
lessons learnt could be of use for future
implementation of such projects.
The report builds upon the previous evaluation
by the International Water Management Institute
(IIMI 1995), which focused on water distribution,
agricultural productivity, and training and farmer
participation up to the 1993–94 rabi season. In the
earlier study, it was found that farmer participation
has shown no significant progress and planned
farmer organizations have not been created; water
distribution along the distributaries has improved;
and significant improvements in agricultural output
have occurred after the introduction of the NWMP
program. The International Water Management
Institute (IWMI) revisited the project to evaluate
the sustenance of the NWMP impact 2 years after
cessation of funding in 1995. The analysis
addresses the following:
• In recent years, has there been a decline in
irrigated area, and changes in cropping pattern
and land and water productivity of rice,
particularly in the tail-end areas after
cessation of funding?2
• Has water management deteriorated in terms
of i) more than allocated water being used, ii)
head-to-tail preferential allotment/use, iii)
changes in irrigation seasons and crop
calendar, and iv) changes in canal operation
schedule?
• Current status of water user associations
(WUAs).
A noteworthy feature of the comparative
analysis is the application of satellite remote
sensing (SRS) techniques to generate objective
and disaggregated information on agricultural
productivity during the rabi seasons, particularly
on rice productivity per unit of land. Multidate data
from the recently launched IRS IC satellite during
the 1997 rabi season also provided indications of
equity and reliability of water distribution between
the distributary commands. Ground data were
obtained from office records, field visits, and
farmer surveys.
The comparative study argues that the
successful operation of a structured system,
particularly in a water-rich environment, is complex
and requires realistic planning, rigorous
implementation (involving wholehearted farmer
participation), and a mechanism for sustaining the
benefits of intervention after cessation of funding.
A critical analysis of the proposed NWMP
interventions for improved water management and
an analysis of the actual water distribution and
agricultural productivity across the command area
during the implementation of the NWMP program
and after cessation of funding support this
argument.
Bhadra Reservoir Project
The BRP (figure 1) constructed between 1946 and
1966 has a gross storage capacity of 2,025 Mm
3, a
live storage of 1,608 Mm
3, and a waterspread area
of 11,200 hectares. The Krishna River Tribunal
awards an annual withdrawal of 1,747 Mm
3 (61.7
thousand million cubic feet), including reservoir
evaporation losses, to the BRP, with 1,400 Mm
3
specific to the Right Bank Canal (RBC) whose
command is covered under the NWMP program.
The RBC, with a full supply discharge of 75 m
3,
commands an area of 92,360 hectares with 29
distributaries taking off directly to irrigate 17,050
hectares. The Anvery Branch Canal (ABC)
commanding 6,320 hectares branches off at
76.4 km down the RBC. The RBC bifurcates at 103
km into the Malebennur Branch Canal (MBC)
benefiting 23,710 hectares, and the Davangere
Branch Canal (DBC) benefiting 45,280 hectares.
Administratively, the whole RBC command area is
divided into three divisions: Bhadravathi canal
division with three subdivisions, Malebennur canal
division with four subdivisions, and Davangere
canal division with four subdivisions.
The annual rainfall in the command area is
about 800 mm, which decreases towards the tail
end. The command area receives most of the
rainfall during the southwest monsoon period of
June–September. The mean monthly
evapotranspiration is equal to or below rainfall
during July–October, but is substantially above
rainfall during the remainder of the year. Even
during the southwest monsoon period, breaks in
the monsoon are frequent, necessitating
supplemental irrigation. The command area is
gently rolling with moderate slopes. The red soil
covers 60 percent of the command area. The
majority of the holdings has less than 1 hectare
each and is generally split into 2–3 parcels.
1A body appointed by the Government of India to apportion the Krishna River water among the riparian states.3
FIGURE 1.
Location of the Bhadra project command area.4
The NWMP program was implemented in the BRP
during 1987–89 and most of the physical
rehabilitation work was completed by that time.
The estimated cost of the project was Indian
Rs 5,500/ha (US$160/ha) at 1994 prices. However,
the external funding for operation, maintenance,
and management was continued up to 1995. Three
periods—pre-intervention up to 1988, intervention
from 1989 to 95, and post-intervention after 1995
are considered for analysis of performance.
The main objective of the NWMP program
was to increase productivity and farm income in
the existing irrigation scheme through a more
reliable, predictable, and equitable irrigation
service. This was to be achieved by developing
the institutional capacity to plan, implement, and
monitor improved O&M practices and providing
low-cost infrastructure improvements to support
the proposed operational plan. The improved water
management was to come from a more
systematic canal operation, reduction of irrigation
wastage, optimization of cropping season,
particularly during the rabi season, and reduction
of crops with high irrigation demands by
manipulating frequencies of irrigation and by
making the best use of rainfall.
Before the introduction of the NWMP program,
rice was grown wherever possible. Water
availability was good in the distributaries that
directly take off from the RBC and in the head
reaches of the branch canals. Irrigation supply
was very unreliable in the tail-reach areas, which
led to the cultivation of mainly semidry crops
(millet, sorghum, etc.). The cropping seasons were
kharif, from July to November and rabi, from
January to May. The NWMP program aimed at
improving the use of water resources by providing
irrigation supply starting from May, which would
enable better use of rainfall by the kharif crops
and lower the irrigation requirement for the rabi
crop that would be sown in November. This plan
required a carryover storage of 250 Mm
3 in the
reservoir for irrigation supply in May and part of
June. The seasonal calendar proposed under the
NWMP program was kharif extending from May 15
to October 15 (153 days) and rabi from November
15 to April 15 (121 days).
The assumed cropping plan of the RBC
command envisaged 100 percent cropping
intensity in the kharif season. In the rabi season,
rice was to be excluded by releasing water to the
RBC intermittently during the first 2 months of the
season. But even with 90 percent of the area
under semidry crops, peak irrigation requirements
in the dry season were so high that within the
capacity limitations of the RBC, only 75 percent
intensity could be supported. The distribution
policy as incorporated in the Staff Appraisal
Report (SAR) (World Bank 1986) envisaged that
the command would be divided into four zones
and every year, one zone, selected in rotation,
would be left out of rabi irrigation.
Under the NWMP program, the available water
resources are allocated proportionally within the
command area. In principle, all farmers receive
their shares based on the acreage they own and/
or rent, irrespective of the crops grown and
location of the farm. The following were the
suggested modifications under the NWMP plan of
activities.
• Sizing of distributaries and lower-level
channels with proportional outlets to prevent
the upper parts of the commands from
monopolizing water withdrawals to the
disadvantage of the lower commands.
• Establishment of a structured distribution
system below the turnout from the RBC/
branch canal in a distributary/minor and
installation of a network of flow measuring
structures at strategic locations.
• Development of systematic linkages between
the O&M agency, other government agencies
and farmers, and strengthening of the O&M
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activities by setting up a Main Canal
Operating Unit (MCOU).
• Making scheme-level monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) the basis for monitoring
operations.
• Submission of reports to the project committee
on seasonal/annual operations (water delivery,
irrigation efficiency, cropped area, farmer satis-
faction, etc.) and modification of subsequent
operational plans using this feedback.
• Training at various levels—orientation training
for senior officers, training in planning for staff
of O&M units, training in design to engineers,
and implementation and operation training to
scheme-level officers and field workers.
• Achieving effective farmer participation
through holding meetings with farmers to
discuss the NWMP plans.
• Organizing farmer committees at each outlet
and higher-level committees for each minor
and distributary.
Basic Data
The historical data on reservoir release and
distribution in branch and distributary canals were
collected from the BRP offices. Agricultural
productivity data in terms of total irrigated area,
area under rice and other crops, and rice
productivity per unit of land were obtained through a
digital analysis of the satellite data of the 1986–87
and subsequent rabi seasons. Satellite inventories
for the 1994–95 and 1996–97 rabi seasons, which
were not available at the time of the previous
evaluation by the International Water Management
Institute (IIMI 1995), have been subsequently
conducted and used in the study. These data
available at the pixel level (30 m x 30 m) can be
aggregated for any desired aerial unit such as a
distributary command or a branch-canal level.
Since crop cutting experiment (CCE) data for the
1996–97 rabi season for sample rice plots were not
available during the study, a satellite-based rice
yield model was developed by normalizing the rice
yield model of the 1992–93 rabi season to the
current
2 season (see annex). An additional feature
of the satellite inventory of the 1996–97 season is
the analysis of 20 IRS IC satellite Wide Field
Sensor (WiFS) data sets (having a repeatability of 5
days compared to 22 days for IRS-2A and IB)
obtained during February–June 1997. The average
WiFS-based Normalized Difference Vegetation
Index (NDVI) for each distributary command plotted
against time represents the rice growth profile
during the rabi season and enables a comparative
analysis of the rice condition through the season
and between the distributary commands.
A farmer survey covering 105 farmers in 7
distributaries (one each in the head and tail ends
of the RBC direct command, one each in the head
and tail ends of the Malebennur branch canal, and
one each in the head, middle, and tail ends of the
Davangere branch canal) was conducted in April
1997 (figure 1). Typically, in each distributary,
three villages were selected, one each in the
head, middle, and tail reaches. Five farmers were
selected from each village; the selection was
based on village records and divided among
farmers on the basis of landholding. A structured
questionnaire was administered to the farmer
respondents, and a database was organized for
further analysis. Interaction with the water user
associations (WUAs) enabled the evaluation of
their current status and effectiveness.
2The term current in this report corresponds to 1997.6
The project report (Government of Karnataka
1986) contemplated that optimum water use would
be achieved through more systematic canal
operation by making the best use of available
rainfall, reducing irrigation wastage, optimizing the
cropping season, particularly during rabi, and
reducing the cropped area demanding high
irrigation by manipulating the irrigation frequency.
This has not been completely or adequately
addressed under the NWMP proposals for
intervention in the Bhadra project. Significant
deficiencies including unrealistic assumptions and
incomplete attention to details have vitiated the
planning process and led to unsatisfactory
impacts during and after implementation.
While the structured system design ensures
water equity by supplying water proportional to the
area irrespective of the crop grown, the assumed
cropping pattern under the NWMP program helped
determine expected water requirements and the
sizing of canal capacities. However, the assumed
cropping pattern was unrealistic and farmer
preference for water-intensive crops had hampered
the smooth implementation of the NWMP program.
The high rainfall in the upper command
(normal annual rainfall of 950 mm in Bhadravathi
compared to 650 mm in the tail end of Davangere)
that makes rice the preferred crop leads to spatial
variability in the cropping pattern in the rabi
season. In this traditional rice-growing area, the
assumption to exclude rice in rabi by adhering to
the operational schedule was bound to fail. Thus a
more realistic assumption of a spatially varying
cropping pattern and an alternative definition of
equity by giving priority for assured water supply
in the two seasons would have had better
implementability. A careful analysis of the previous
cropping response to irrigation supplies and the
rainfall pattern, and consultation with farmer
groups would have resulted in a more realistic
cropping pattern. The steps and strategies
required to achieve farmer consensus and
participation for effective supply management and
rotational water supply have not been sufficiently
detailed and no specific funds have been
earmarked for this activity.
To use rainfall effectively, the canal supply
needs to be variable and capable of adjustment.
However, the NWMP program proposed that the
branch canals be designed with a capacity equal
to the sum of capacities of the offtaking
distributaries (with allowance for losses), and be
operated at the maximum flow constantly. This
would mean that if a distributary under a branch
canal is closed due to less demand, the excess
flow would just get redistributed among other
distributaries or flow downstream. In either case,
no saving would result.
When the main canal is operated at varying
flow rates, closing a distributary can result in
savings only if there is a corresponding change in
the release at the RBC head regulator or when a
closed distributary of similar capacity is opened.
This requires a tightly operated system with
excellent communication facilities and an effective
decision-making system. The NWMP program did
not propose to develop such supporting
mechanisms. Thus the assumption of water
saving through the effective use of rainfall under
the NWMP program is invalidated at the planning
stage itself.
The effective use of rainfall and the
consequent reduced reservoir withdrawals were to
be achieved by advancing the kharif sowing to
mid-May by providing irrigation water from the
storage carried over from the previous water year.
This was corroborated by a simulation study
showing that the carryover storage of 250 Mm
3
including the storage required to meet all the
evaporation losses from the reservoir was
available every year during 1974–84. The rabi
sowing was to be correspondingly advanced to
November, reducing the crop water requirements in
this season.
The operational plan proposed running the
Right Bank Canal (RBC) continuously during the
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advanced kharif season, resulting in a withdrawal
of 985 Mm
3 from the reservoir. The withdrawal in
the rabi season with three initial cycles of on-off
operations is computed to be 674 Mm
3. Thus the
annual withdrawal is 1,659 Mm
3, and with 175
Mm
3 allocated to the Left Bank Canal (LBC) and a
reservoir evaporation of 172 Mm
3, the total
the three periods (pre-intervention, intervention,
and post-intervention) investigated. The
advancement of the kharif season to 15 May and,
consequently, the rabi season to 15 November as
contemplated in the original proposal has not been
achieved and the seasonal calendar has varied
widely from year to year, more so in the kharif
season. The start of the kharif season was
delayed particularly after 1994–95 because of the
vagaries of the monsoon season. The gap
between the planned and actual withdrawals from
the reservoir is shown in figure 2. Water utilization
during the rabi season became more critical when
the 25 percent zoning policy under the NWMP
program was abandoned during 1992–93, and the
whole RBC command was provided with irrigation
supplies. Excess water utilization in the rabi
season thus has been increasing, against the
computed rabi allocation of 674 Mm
3, from 19
percent during 1992–93 to more than 30 percent
after 1994–95, when compared to 35 percent in
the pre-NWMP year (table 2). Although
withdrawals during kharif were less than those
stipulated in the NWMP proposals, the annual
withdrawals had been steadily increasing from
1992–93 to 1996–97 (0–5 percent). The marginal
decrease in excess withdrawals in 1996–97 was
due to poor rainfall in the BRP catchment (Bhadra
catchment area received 1,245 mm in 1996
compared to the 1,569 mm normal rainfall)
withdrawal works out to 2,006 Mm
3 against an
allocation of 1,747 Mm
3 by the Krishna River
Tribunal Award. Any saving could only be
achieved by operating the main canal with varying
flow, and as mentioned earlier, this was not an
effective proposition.
Comparative Analysis of Performance: Before, during, and after
Intervention
This section compares the performance before,
during, and after implementation of the NWMP
program. The main focus will be on water
management, agricultural productivity, and farmer
perceptions, with less attention to other NWMP
elements. The collapse of the guide wall at the
entrance to the RBC in September 1991 marked a
change from the then-prevailing 75 percent zoning
to irrigate the whole area in the rabi season.
Therefore, the performance during the period 1992–
95 is taken to represent the impact during implemen-
tation unless otherwise specified. The post-imple-
mentation period is considered to be after 1995.
Water Management
The start of canal operation was delayed in three
out of the six seasons during the pre-intervention
period. It was on time, as planned, during the
intervention period up to 1995 rabi. Canal
operation occurred earlier than the planned date
after the 1995 kharif season (table 1). The number
of days the canal was operated also varied in all
the seasons and the gap between the planned
number of days and the actual number of days of
operation was very wide, especially during the
post-intervention period. Substantial deviations
from the planned water distribution schedules
under the NWMP program are seen (table 1) for all8
resulting in lower reservoir storage levels in this
year. Thus the NWMP program objective of
restricting water use within the Tribunal (law court)
allocation has not been achieved, and water
utilization, in contrast, has been increasing since
1992–93. The rather significant increase in water
utilization since 1994–95 is perhaps due to the
physical deterioration of the system caused by the
lack of maintenance.
The NWMP program postulated equity on the
basis of water delivered proportional to the area
irrigated, irrespective of the cropping pattern.
Deviations from equity are seen, when the head
reaches receive preferential deliveries at the
expense of the tail-end portion (table 3). The direct
commands under the RBC and the ABC draw more
than their share, with a marked decrease in water
receipts in the MBC and the DBC. The tail end of
the DBC seems to be the main sufferer, with only
41.9 percent allocation against 46.5 percent
postulated under the NWMP program and even
lesser than in the pre-NWMP 1986–87 rabi season.
The inequity evident even during the kharif season
indicates that the higher amount of rainfall in the
head reach had not been appropriately utilized. The
inequity between the head and tail reaches has also
been increasing in recent years. The similarity in
inequity in the kharif and rabi seasons seems to be
the result of the similarity in the extent of rice
cultivation in both seasons.
TABLE 1.
Irrigation schedule: Planned and actual.
Type of intervention Year and season Planned schedule Actual schedule
Start date No. of days of Start date No. of days of
canal operation canal operation
Pre-intervention 1986 rabi 1 Jan 64 1 Jan 91
1986 kharif 5 July 139 7 July 148
1987 rabi 15 Dec 138 22 Dec 153
1987 kharif 15 June 80 29 June 98
1988 rabi 28 Nov 72 11 Jan 88
1988 kharif 5 July 126 7 July 139
Average Rabi 91 111
Kharif 115 128
Intervention with zoning 1989 rabi 6 Jan 94 8 Jan 125
1989 kharif 8 July 146 9 July 144
1990 rabi 1 Jan 110 2 Jan 129
1990 kharif 15 June 123 16 June 149
1991 rabi 1 Dec 102 4 Dec 161
1991 kharif 5 June 123 12 June 100
Average Rabi 102 138
Kharif 131 131
Intervention without zoning 1992 kharif 5 July 149 6 July 134
1993 rabi 1 Dec 126 1 Dec 151
1993 kharif 25 June 160 27 June 164
1994 rabi 27 Dec 142 28 Dec 137
1994 kharif 26 June 153 26 June 150
1995 rabi - - 18 Dec 161
1995 kharif 21 Aug 92 13 July 147
Average Rabi 134 Rabi 150
Kharif 139 Kharif 149
Post-intervention without zoning 1996 rabi 22 Jan 103 27 Dec 158
1996 kharif 30 July 124 11 July 143
1997 rabi 18 Jan 118 1 Jan 147
Average Rabi 111 153
Kharif 124 143
Note: In the original proposal of the NWMP program, the kharif season was planned for 153 days and rabi for 121 days.9
FIGURE 2.
Comparison of actual and planned seasonal delivery through the years.
In addition to the preferential allocation to the
head-end branch canals, inequity also exists
between the distributaries under each branch
canal, though in a different manner. The
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI)
profiles, derived from IRS IC satellite wide field
sensor (WiFS) data of 20 overpass dates through
the 1997 rabi season, enabled the analysis of
spatial and temporal homogeneity with regard to
equity, adequacy, and timeliness of water
distribution (figure 3). The NDVI profiles of the
RBC suggest a different cropping pattern from
other branch canals as NDVI started with a high
variability (20–100) whereas other branch canals
were within a limited range (20-40). The dispersion
of the profiles within each branch canal and the10
TABLE 2.
Excess withdrawals from the reservoir.
Year Excess withdrawal (% of planned








*With reference to 1,959 Mm
3
 planned under the NWMP program
for annual withdrawal, and to 674 Mm
3 for rabi withdrawal.
contrary to the ABC and RBC commands. These
indicate, as corroborated by the high yield in table
4, better management in the middle and water-
short tail end of the command compared to the
upper part with excess water withdrawal. The gaps
in the data of the NDVI profiles are due to cloud
cover in the WiFS data coverage on these
overpass dates.
It has not been possible to operate all the
distributaries simultaneously at specified
discharges in the kharif season because the
distributaries in the upper reaches drew higher
than the specified discharges and the RBC
capacity was inadequate. The rabi operational plan
calls for a strict calendar for an on-off operation of
all the distributaries simultaneously with the RBC
also following the calendar. Rabi zoning has been
abandoned since the 1992–93 rabi season. The
RBC has been operated continuously since 1994
highest NDVI value reached are also different. The
tight bunching and similar magnitude and shape of
profiles in the DBC and MBC commands indicate
better equity, and similar adequacy and timeliness,
TABLE 3.
Water shares among the branch canals and the ratio of actual to nominal share.
Season Total RBC ABC MBC DBC
discharge Actual Actual/ Actual Actual/ Actual Actual/ Actual Actual/
share nominal share nominal share nominal share nominal
M C M% % %% % % %%
Kharif
1986 767.4 19.1 85 9.6 148 25.3 104 46.0 99
1992 822.7 22.1 98 9.4 145 23.5 96 45.0 97
1993 914.6 24.4 108 9.3 143 22.5 92 43.8 94
1994 861.5 20.1 89 9.6 148 24.1 99 46.2 99
1995 856.5 26.1 115 8.2 126 23.5 96 42.2 91
1996 884.0 28.7 127 8.2 126 21.5 88 41.6 89
Rabi
1987 911.5 25.2 112 8.4 129 23.3 95 43.1 93
1993 804.4 25.1 111 8.4 129 23.6 97 42.9 92
1994 816.0 24.7 109 8.6 132 23.4 96 43.3 93
1995 876.7 20.2 89 8.9 137 21.5 88 40.4 87
1996 890.4 23.6 104 8.9 137 23.5 96 44.0 95
1997 849.2 27.2 120 8.1 125 22.4 92 41.9 90




Notes: RBC= Right Bank Canal; ABC= Anvery Branch Canal; MBC= Malebennur Branch Canal; DBC= Davangere Branch Canal.11
FIGURE 3.
Distributary-wise seasonal vegetation index profiles under different branch canals (1997 rabi season).1
2 TABLE 4.
Satellite-derived cropping pattern in the Bhadra command area: Irrigation intensity, percentage of rice area, and rice yield during the rabi season.
Division Sub- 1986–87 1989–90 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1996–97
division Irr. Rice area Rice Irr. Rice area Rice Irr. Rice area Rice Irr. Rice area Rice Irr. Rice area Rice Irr. Rice area Rice
int. intensity yield int. intensity yield int. intensity yield int. intensity yield int. intensity yield int. intensity yield
% % (t/ha) % %  (t/ha) % % (t/ha) % % (t/ha) % % (t/ha) % % (t/ha)
Bhadravathi
(RBC) No.1 95.0 60.0 2.4 53.0 21.0 4.5 88.0 61.0 3.8 95.0 64.0 4.2 83.0 52.0 4.5 73.0 57.0 4.4
No.2 46.0 40.0 3.7 84.0 68.0 4.7 91.0 61.0 4.2 75.0 53.0 4.2 81.0 59.0 4.2 80.0 53.0 3.3
No.3 71.0 37.0 3.4 102.0 27.0 4.2 140.0 49.0 3.8 124.0 30.0 4.6 115.0 48.0 4.7 112.0 36.0 3.2
Total 67.0 48.0 3.2 78.0 46.0 4.6 101.0 58.0 4.0 92.0 49.0 4.3 90.0 54.0 4.4 85.0 49.0 3.6
Malabennur No.1 99.0 72.0 4.3 79.0 90.0 6.1 116.0 89.0 5.8 113.0 83.0 5.6 109.0 88.0 5.8 110.0 86.0 4.5
No.2 48.0 56.0 3.3 40.0 46.0 5.0 42.0 66.0 4.0 61.0 54.0 4.5 62.0 67.0 4.0 58.0 62.0 4.2
No.3 74.0 59.0 4.1 55.0 60.0 6.0 80.0 73.0 4.9 77.0 75.0 5.2 71.0 84.0 5.4 78.0 79.0 4.4
No.4 79.0 61.0 3.7 79.0 79.0 5.7 98.0 77.0 4.9 76.0 72.0 5.2 85.0 81.0 5.4 83.0 72.0 3.8
Total 80.0 65.0 4.1 66.0 76.0 5.9 91.0 81.0 5.3 87.0 76.0 5.3 86.0 84.0 5.5 88.0 80.0 4.3
Davanagere No.1 61.0 45.0 3.8 74.0 23.0 4.9 81.0 52.0 4.0 73.0 60.0 4.8 67.0 59.0 4.6 71.0 56.0 3.7
No.2 92.0 54.0 4.0 98.0 40.0 5.2 108.0 67.0 4.5 102.0 69.0 4.6 99.0 67.0 4.6 104.0 71.0 4.6
No.3 79.0 59.0 3.7 35.0 44.0 4.5 86.0 78.0 4.4 92.0 78.0 4.4 91.0 75.0 4.4 90.0 73.0 4.8
No.4 65.0 42.0 3.4 68.0 35.0 5.2 72.0 63.0 4.5 69.0 74.0 4.9 73.0 71.0 4.8 69.0 73.0 3.8
Total 75.0 51.0 3.8 69.0 35.0 5.1 87.0 66.0 4.4 84.0 71.0 4.6 83.0 68.0 4.6 84.0 69.0 4.3
Command area total 75.0 56.0 3.8 69.0 51.0 5.4 91.0 69.0 4.7 87.0 69.0 4.9 85.0 71.0 5.0 85.0 69.0 4.2
Note: Irr. int. = Irrigation intensity.13
yet a set calendar has not been followed in the
on-off operations of distributaries, implying the
tacit acceptance of field realities.
A major departure from O&M regulations is that
the pressure exerted by farmers for water could not
be withstood and, consequently, there was a
changeover from supply- to demand- management.
Gates were reintroduced at the heads of some
minors in some tail-end distributaries of the DBC,
which marked a departure from the structured
system design of the NWMP program, indicating a
tendency to correct for deviation in water
distribution in the upper command by an ad hoc
solution at the tail end.
In spite of the well-constructed measuring
structures at the distributary offtakes and along
the RBC, the monitoring of system operations has
remained weak. Only three distributaries, the
same every year, were covered under intensive
monitoring. The monitoring report does not
highlight the difference between targeted and
actual deliveries, the relative performance along
the sample distributaries, and the implications of
the existing cropping pattern on the operational
plan. The scheme-level report is also inadequate
without an emphasis on the pattern of deliveries
within the system and the extent of equity. The
M&E exercise does not cover groundwater status.
An indication of the deteriorating M&E efficiency
was the greatest difficulty faced by the authors in
obtaining canal discharge data from the divisional
offices. While, during the early years of the
NWMP intervention, the data were compiled and
documented at the division and circle offices, the
data of 1996–97 had not been compiled at these
offices even after the end of the rabi season.
Agricultural Productivity through the
Years
The spatial variability in irrigation intensity,
percentage of rice area, and rice yield across the
canal divisions in the rabi season are shown in
table 4.
The overall irrigation intensity has increased
(statistically significant at 5% level) from 75
percent during 1986–87 to 91 percent during 1992–
93. The irrigation intensity in the subsequent rabi
seasons has declined from that of 1992–93, and
is not significantly different from the level before
the implementation of the NWMP program. The
area under rice has increased (significant at 5%
level) from 56 percent during 1986–87 to 69
percent during 1992–93. The rice area in the
subsequent rabi seasons is similar to that of
1992–93, but is significantly different (at 5% level)
from the rice area in the 1986–87 rabi season.
The average rice productivity per unit of land, both
during and after the intervention years is
significantly different from that of the 1986–87 rabi
season. However, the average rice yield during
1996–97, i.e., the first rabi season in the post-
intervention period, is significantly lower (at 5%
level) than that recorded during the intervention
period. The agricultural performances in all three
divisions, i.e., Bhadravathi in the head end,
Malebennur division in the middle, and
Davanagere in the tail end have more or less the
same trend as that shown for the total command
area (table 4). For example, in the Davangere
canal division, the irrigation intensity rose from 75
percent during 1986–87 to 87 percent during
1992–93 (significant only at 10% level). The
irrigation intensity in the subsequent time periods,
for example, 84 percent during 1996–97, is not
significantly different (at 5% level) from the
irrigation intensity during the 1986–87 rabi season.
The rice intensity in the tail-end section has
increased from 51 percent during 1986–87 to 66
percent during 1992–93 (significant at 5% level)
and has stabilized since then. The rice yield has
significantly increased (at 5 percent level) from 3.8
tons/ha during 1986–87 to 4.4 tons/ha during
1992–93. The yields during the other time periods
during and after intervention are also significantly
higher than those in the 1986-87 rabi season.
The irrigation deliveries are available only at
the divisional level. The rice productivity per unit
of water diverted at the reservoir has been14
steadily declining through the years from 0.45 kg/
m
3 during the 1992–93 rabi season, to 0.36 kg/m
3
during the 1996–97 rabi season, against 0.25 kg/
m
3 during the 1986–87 rabi season (table 5).
The decrease in irrigated area, rice intensity,
and yield during the 1996–97 rabi season is
attributable partly to poor reservoir inflows and
partly to greater conveyance losses due to poor
maintenance of, as well as damage to, irrigation
structures. Field visits and observations made by
the authors during farmer surveys indicate broken
irrigation structures in many places in the tail end.
However, the decline in rice productivity per unit of
land from previous years is more as the farmers
irrigate the near-normal areas with less depth of
water due to conveyance losses and less
reservoir withdrawal. These findings are well
reflected by the WiFS NDVI profiles of different
branch canals (figure 3).
Farmer participation
Farmer participation in the NWMP program is
extremely weak. Of the five activities proposed
under the NWMP program for farmer
participation—meeting with farmers, creating a
farmer organization below each outlet, organizing a
water utilization committee for each minor or
distributary, farmer training, and creation of a
scheme-level committee—none materialized.
However, the Bhadra Command Area Development
Authority created nine village-based farmer
cooperatives between 1992 and 1994. Among
these, the tail-area farmer cooperatives were
relatively stronger than the head-end cooperatives
in solving their water problems during the
implementation of the NWMP program. One such
farmer cooperative, started in 1992 at
Tiruchughatta at the tail end of the 8th distributary
in the DBC, was doing well during the
implementation of the NWMP program. When the
authors visited it in 1997, it had become defunct,
although the name of the organization remained.
The situation was the same with two other
organizations that the authors visited in 1997. The
functions of the scheme-level committee
suggested under the NWMP program are carried
out by the traditional district-level Irrigation
Consultation Committee (ICC), which is less
effective. Out of the 39 members on the
committee, only 4 are farmers; they too are
nominated as political representatives and are not
elected directly by the farmers of the BRP. Most
importantly, the ICC neither evaluates the system
performance nor oversees the NWMP program
activities.
TABLE 5.
Rice productivity through the rabi seasons.
Year Water Equivalent Rice productivity Equivalent rice Rice productivity
supplied rice areaa per unit land productionb per unit waterc
(Mm3) (ha) (t/ha) (t) (kg/m3)
1987 911.5 60,394 3.8 229,497 0.25
1993 804.4 77,612 4.7 364,776 0.45
1994 816 73,877 4.9 361,997 0.44
1995 876.7 73,364 5 366,820 0.42
1997 849.2 72,836 4.2 305,911 0.36
a
Computed as rice area + 0.6 x non-rice area (non-rice area water consumption is approximately 0.6 times the consumed water per unit
rice area).
b
Computed as equivalent rice area x rice productivity per unit of land.
c
Computed as equivalent rice production divided by water volume diverted at the reservoir during the rabi season.15
Farmer perceptions
The analysis is based on the data generated using
a farmer-survey questionnaire. Three levels of
aggregation are considered for the analysis. The
first level considers the total command area as a
unit. The second level considers the grouping of
distributaries as the head, middle, and tail end.
The third level clubs the parcels at the head,
middle, and tail reaches along distributaries as
separate units. The results of the analysis for the
first two levels are presented in figures 4–7 while
the analysis of the third level is presented in
figures 8–11. The results presented in these
figures depict the present condition (as of 1997) of
water distribution as well as the change of
performance and the condition of the system
before and after rehabilitation.
Figure 4 presents the irrigation adequacy of
the current supply and change since the
rehabilitation of the kharif and rabi seasons. The
horizontal bars show the percentage of the
sampled farmers who reported “never adequate at
present”
3 and “better in the past,” i.e., before
rehabilitation. For the command as a whole, only
20 percent of the farmers reported that they never
received adequate water in either irrigation season.
However, there is head-tail disparity of current
water adequacy along the main canal.
For kharif, almost 45 percent of the farmers in
the tail end have reported that water was never
adequate compared to 9 percent in the middle end
and nearly zero percent in the head-end
distributaries. The farmer perception of current
adequacy is significantly dependent on the
location of the distributaries (Pearsons chi-
square=35.6 for kharif and 21.7 for rabi, df=4). In
the command area, 40 percent of the farmers
reported that adequacy was better before
rehabilitation than after rehabilitation. The
percentage of farmers with such opinion varied
from the head end (25%) to the tail end (70%).
3The term at present also corresponds to 1997 as the term current.
FIGURE 4.
Irrigation adequacy in the command area—present condition and change since rehabilitation: Responses to farmer-
survey questionnaire (in %).16
As in the case of current adequacy, the farmer
perception of change in adequacy since
rehabilitation is also significantly dependent on the
location of the distributary (chi-square=18.2 for
kharif and 11.8 for rabi, df=4). A possible reason
for this type of response in the context of water
diversion into the canal being stepped up may be
due to the increased irrigated area after
rehabilitation with high percentage of rice
cultivation requiring more water.
Figure 5 presents irrigation equity and change
in equity before and after rehabilitation for both the
kharif and rabi seasons. The horizontal bars
represent percentage of farmers who reported
“rarely fair at present” and “better in the past.” The
figure indicates that equity is not a major problem
in the head and middle reaches while it is a
problem in the tail-end distributaries, where 24
percent of the farmers during kharif and 61
percent of the farmers during rabi reported “rarely
fair at present.” Farmer perception of current
equity is significantly dependent on the distributary
location (chi-square =19.2 for kharif and 23.8 for
rabi, df=4) as the majority of the farmers in the
head end reported either “mostly” or “sometimes
fair” and the majority of the farmers in the tail end
reported either “sometimes” or “rarely fair.” A
quarter of the farmers in the command area
perceived that equity was better before
rehabilitation. However, this percentage was very
high (57% for kharif and 73% for rabi) for the tail-
end farmers who perceived both adequacy and
equity as problems mainly because of the shift to
irrigate larger areas with rice and the constraints in
pushing sufficient water to the tail-end
distributaries.
Figure 6 presents farmer perception of the
functional condition (current and also the change
since rehabilitation) of the canals within the unit,
and also at the main system level. Uniformly from
the head end to the tail end, about 60 percent of
the farmers reported that the condition of canals is
poor within the unit at present. About 40 percent
of the farmers in each reach reported that the
functionality of the main system is poor at
present. However, with regard to the change in
FIGURE 5.
Irrigation equity in the command area—present condition and change since rehabilitation: Responses to farmer-
survey questionnaire (in %).17
functionality of the system, both within the unit
and in the main system, about 30 percent of the
farmers in the head and middle ends and about 70
percent of farmers in the tail end reported that
functionality was better for the whole system
before rehabilitation. As mentioned above, the
farmer perception of change since rehabilitation is
significantly dependent on the location of their
distributaries (chi-square=10.1 for within unit and
19.15 for main system, df=4). Major reasons for
this kind of perception appears to be the
mismatch between the water requirement of the
irrigated area with high intensity water-loving crops
and the main system constraint coupled with
operational policy adopted by the irrigation agency.
Figure 7 is a representation of the frequency
of conflicts at present as well as the change in
the frequency of conflicts after rehabilitation.
When water becomes inequitable and inadequate,
especially in the tail end, conflicts increase. About
33 percent of the farmers in the whole command
have reported frequent conflicts at present.
However, this number in the tail-reach
FIGURE 6.
Functional condition of irrigation canals in the command area—present condition and change since rehabilitation:
Responses to farmer-survey questionnaire (in %).
distributaries is 48 percent. Also, 36 percent of
the farmers in the command area and 57 percent
at the tail end reported that conflicts became more
frequent since rehabilitation. The farmer perception
of conflicts at present and also since rehabilitation
is significantly dependent on the location of the
distributaries (chi-square=20.7 for present and 12.4
for change since rehabilitation, df =4).
From figures 8 and 9, it can be seen that
while the responses of farmers with regard to
adequacy and equity in kharif are different along
the head, middle, and tail reaches of the tail-end
distributaries, the responses during rabi are
distinctly different. Farmers in the middle and tail
reaches reported more about inadequacy and
inequity than those in the head reach. The
inadequate and inequitable distribution of water
has also given rise to conflicts among farmers
(figure 11), especially within the head and tail
reaches. Figure 10 presents the farmer responses,
“poor condition now” and “better in the past,” to
the functional condition of the tail distributaries
within the unit and the main system supplying18
FIGURE 7.
Frequency of conflicts in the command area—present condition and change since rehabilitation: Responses to farmer-
survey questionnaire (in %).
FIGURE 8.
Irrigation adequacy in tail-end distributaries—present condition and change since rehabilitation: Responses to farmer-
survey questionnaire (in %).19
FIGURE 9.
Irrigation equity in tail-end distributaries—present condition and change since rehabilitation: Responses to farmer-
survey questionnaire (in %).
FIGURE 10.
Functional condition of irrigation canals in tail-end distributaries—present condition and change since rehabilitation:
Responses to farmer-survey questionnaire (in %).20
water to these distributaries. The first observation
is that the functionality within the units
(distributaries) is poorer than at the main system
and that the functionality of both the distributary
and the main system was better before
intervention than it is now. Again within the units,
the tail-reach farmers (89%) feel that the present
condition is poor compared to 52 percent of the
farmers in the head reach. Though the number of
farmers in each category is not adequate for a
statistical analysis, a major conclusion that can
be drawn from figures 8 to 11 is that there is
inequity and inadequacy of water supply among
field plots within the tail distributaries and that
those plots within middle and tail reaches suffer
more than the plots in the head reaches.
Impact of Closure of World Bank Credit
World Bank credit for the Bhadra Reservoir Project
closed in March 1995, after incurring an
FIGURE 11.
Frequency of conflicts in tail-end distributaries—present condition and change since rehabilitation: Responses to
farmer-survey questionnaire (in %)
expenditure of about US$11 million
4 against the
estimated US$5.5 million. The balance work
estimated to cost US$0.22 million has not yet
been completed. The impacts of the credit closure
in regard to both financial and supervisory inputs
are reflected in the slackening of system
performance. With the closing of the additional
O&M funds coming from the external credit,
maintenance has become poor and structures that
are broken in many places have not been
reconstructed. The actual performance in recent
years has shown an increasing deviation from the
NWMP program objective of more equitable,
reliable, and predictable irrigation supplies, which
could not be achieved even during the NWMP
period. The agricultural calendars stipulated in the
NWMP program proposal have not been followed;
actual and planned operations were different, and
the advancing of the kharif season could not be
implemented due to farmer unwillingness. Water
utilization, particularly in the rabi season, has
been increasing and agricultural performance (total
4US$1.00 = Indian Rs 35.0021
irrigated area, area under rice, and rice yield) has
been on the decline. The tail-end deprivation, due
to preferential water allocation to the head-reach
areas, is stressing agricultural performance in this
command, though, through deficit irrigation,
farmers at the tail end have maintained irrigation
and rice intensities. Farmer participation, and
particularly the institution of water user association
(WUA), has declined. No new WUA has been
formed and the existing ones have become
nonfunctional. The farm survey indicates that a
large majority feels that system performance was
better in the past than it is now.
Summary of Analysis
Many interventions as contemplated in the Staff
Appraisal Report of the NWMP program could not
be fully operationalized for various reasons
analyzed in this report.
In spite of these deficiencies, the agricultural
performance (irrigation efficiency, rice irrigation
intensity, land and water productivity) of the
project has significantly improved during the
intervention and the post-intervention periods
compared to the pre-intervention period. For
example, in the tail end Davangere canal division,
the irrigation intensity rose from 75 percent during
1986–87 to 87 percent during 1992–93 and slightly
declined to 84 percent during 1996–97. The rice
intensity in the tail end increased from 51 percent
in 1986–87 to 66 percent during 1992–93 and has
stabilized since then. The rice yield significantly
increased from 3.8 tons/ha during 1986–87 to
4.4 tons/ha during 1992–93 and slightly declined
to 4.3 tons/ha during 1996–97. The productivity
per unit of water delivered at the reservoir
increased from 0.25 kg/m
 3 in 1986–87 to
0.45 kg/m
3 during 1992–93 and slightly declined to
0.36 kg/m
 3 during 1996–97.
After the closure of World Bank credit in 1995,
there has been a declining trend in all other
agricultural performance indicators, except in rice
irrigation intensity. Data are not sufficient to pinpoint
whether this decline is due to the deteriorating
condition of the physical management systems, or
poor reservoir inflow in 1996–97, or both.
Three major factors appear to have
constrained the potential performance of the
system. They are:
• switching to a cropping pattern dominated by
water-intensive crops such as rice during the
rabi season,
• abandoning the zoning of area (as envisaged
by the NWMP program) and irrigating the full
extent of the command during the rabi
season, and
• the lack of proper institutional mechanisms
such as farmer organizations and their
committed involvement in operation,
maintenance, and management of the system.22
Lessons Learnt
The management problems in a structured system
are directly related to the level of structuring.
Supply management, in the context of a
heterogeneous cropping pattern of different
irrigation requirements cannot succeed unless
farmers organize to coordinate water distribution
below the distributary, minor, or outlet. The
structured system shifts the responsibility for
operation and maintenance from the operating
agency to the farmers. Thus in a traditional
demand-based system such as the Bhadra
Project, farmer organizations at the scheme level
and at the appropriate subunit level are necessary
prerequisites for the success of a structured
system. This did not happen in the Bhadra Project
where the emphasis continued to be on system
rehabilitation rather than on farmer training and
organization. Farmer participation both in decision
making at the scheme level, and in O&M at the
distributary level needs to be given primary
importance, and detailed guidelines and
mechanisms need to be put in place in the early
stages of implementation itself.
The design of the structured system in the
Bhadra Project was constrained by limited funds
provided for institutional strengthening within the
system and the need to work within the existing
hydraulic system limitations. The operating
procedures of the structured system did not
explicitly take into account the heavy rainfall and
its spatial variability across the command area.
The proposed cropping pattern was unrealistic,
particularly in the context of complete absence of
farmer acceptance and adherence to rules of
operation. Farmer involvement in planning, design,
and implementation is crucial and it needs to be
committed and motivated.
The successful operation of a structured
system also requires a concomitant institutional
change. In the Bhadra Project, for instance, the
Karnataka Irrigation Act legalizing “localization”
(traditional demand-based system) has created
confusion between supply and demand
management. This confusion continued and
exerted pressure on the scheme-operating agency
and its functions.
Farmer involvement and the acceptance of the
operational plan are essential for a supply-based
technology. In the absence of a scheme-level
committee and functional farmer associations, the
NWMP experiment in Bhadra was bound to fail.
The conflicts among the farmers continued and
resulted in undue pressures on the scheme
operators who tinkered with the operation in an ad
hoc fashion. The slide back into a quasi-demand-
based supply and the ad hoc functioning
prevented rigorous implementation of the
operational plans resulting in less equity, reliability,
and predictability.
The maintenance of the system failed in view
of insufficient grants, more so since it had not
been transferred to the WUAs. The farmers
continued to feel that maintenance is the
responsibility of the Irrigation Department, which
did not have adequate funds anyway. Damages to
structures by farmers continued with no repairs
being undertaken. The formation of WUAs and
transfer of O&M responsibilities of the structured
system are essential for a successful O&M
activity. A strong M&E program will support the
reviewing and refining of operational plans.
In the absence of a continuing support
mechanism by way of institutional arrangements
and farmer participation, the Bhadra Project is
showing signs of decline, with water management
sliding back to a quasi-demand-based supply.
Strong farmer involvement thus holds the key to
sustainable performance.23
Since crop cutting experiment data (in which rice
yields are estimated on ground from statistically
sampled plots) for 1996–97 were not available
during the study period, the satellite-based rice
estimation model developed for the 1992–93 rabi
season was updated for the 1996–97 rabi season
through satellite data normalization procedures.
The existing rice yield model, which is based
on IRS satellite LISS-I sensor data of the 1992–93
rabi season, was normalized for LISS-I data of the
1996–97 rabi season by comparing the two sets of
data for stationary targets whose reflectance
remained unchanged. The difference in NDVI
value was found to be only 3–4 digital counts,
which is not significant, and hence the 1992–93
model can be used unchanged for LISS-I data of
1996–97. The LISS I based model was then
normalized for LISS-III data of the same season
by regressing NDVI of concurrent LISS I and LISS
II data of 7 April and 10 April 1997. The rice yield
model is now normalized for LISS III data of 7th
April 1997. However, the model based on the
single date (7 April 1997) needs to be updated for
NDVI data of the milking stage of the rice crop,
which would occur in different calendar periods
across the command area due to staggered rice
transplantation.
Time composite WiFS data were generated by
picking the maximum Vegetation Index (VI) value
ANNEX
Satellite-Based Rice Yield Estimation in the 1996–97 Rabi Season
(corresponding to milking stage of rice) from a set
of coregistered 12 WIFS data sets from mid-
March to May 1997. The ratio of WiFS-derived
NDVI data of 10 April 1997 to time composite
NDVI is computed and applied to LISS-III derived
NDVI data, to compute the expected peak (time
composite) LISS III NDVI value for use in the
model.
The assumption that LISS III and WiFS are
equally sensitive to vegetation response was
tested. The ratios of LISS III NDVI data of 10
April and 4 May were computed, as also the ratios
of WiFS data of the same dates and regressed
with each other. The slope of regression line is
0.96, indicating equal sensitivity of LISS-III and
WiFS to the vegetation response.
Since Crop Cutting Experiment (CCE) data for
the 1996–97 rabi season were not available, the
updated rice yield model was validated through
farmer enquiries and enquiries with the Bhadra
Command Area Development Authority and
irrigation engineers. In an earlier study, a similar
category of the rice yield model of the 1992–93
rabi season had however been validated against
actual CCE data of the 1993–94 rabi season, with
deviations from predicted to actual being less than
10 percent (Murthy et al. 1995).24
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